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REFLECTIONS ON
THE REVOLUTION AT STANFORD
F.A. Muller
Abstract. We inquire into the question whether the classical ideal of science
has been realised by the Model Revolution, initiated at Stanford Univer-
sity during the 1950ies and spread all around the world of philosophy of
science — salute P. Suppes. The guiding principle of the Model Revolution
is: a scientific theory is a set of structures in the domain of discourse of axiomatic
set-theory, characterised by a set-theoretical predicate. We expound some
critical reflections on the Model Revolution; the conclusions will be that the
philosophical problem of what a scientific theory is has not been solved yet—
pace P. Suppes. While reflecting critically on the Model Revolution, we also
explore a proposal of how to complete the Revolution and briefly address
the intertwined subject of scientific representation, which has come to occupy
center stage in philosophy of science over the past decade.
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1 Preamble
You, dear Reader, are pleased to call again, and with some earnestness, for my thoughts on the
late proceedings at Stanford University. I shall not give you reason to imagine, that I think
my sentiments of such value as to wish myself to be solicited about them. They are of too little
consequence to be very anxiously either communicated or withheld. It was from attention to
you, and to you only, that I hesitated at the time, when you first desired to receive them. In the
first letter I had the honour to write to you, and which at length I send, I wrote neither for nor
from any description of men; nor shall I in this. My errors, if any, are my own. My reputation
alone is to answer for them.
This opening paragraph is (with minor modifications) the opening paragraph of
Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in Lon-
don Relative to that Event, in a Letter intended to have been sent to a Gentleman in Paris
(1790) by the right honourable Edmund Burke. In this long letter to Chames-Jean-
Franc¸ois de Pont, which detonated the great debate on the French Revolution, Burke
defended a Traditionalism that involved a return to an earlier humanity and that con-
tained revolutionary counter-revolutionary prescriptions. Reflections is and always has
been a source of inspiration and of arguments for conservative politicians all around
the world. Burke’s style combines, in varying proportions, a perspicacious rational-
ity, a formidable sonority, a Gothic if not pathetic severity, and a furious irony that
frequently glides into a savage sarcasm.1
In sharp contrast to all of this, the current paper is not a ‘Letter intended to have
been sent to a Lady at Stanford University’ but is based on a presentation at the engag-
ing conference ‘The Classical Model of Science’ (Amsterdam, Free University, January
2007); further, it does not advocate a return to an earlier period in the philosophy of
science, let alone that it contains ‘revolutionary counter-revolutionary prescriptions’,
and, last but not least, its style is cool, calm and collected. What is analogous in it
to Burke’s Reflections is that it recognises as revolutionary the change in our thinking
about the nature of scientific theories that began at Stanford University about half a
century ago under the lead of Patrick Suppes, and that it expounds some reflections
on this revolution in the philosophy of science of a critical nature. In addition it also
provides some suggestions of how to complete this Model Revolution, rather than to
return to the ancien re´gime. Critically progressive rather than critically conservative is
the spirit of this paper.
We begin by providing a succinct summary of what the ‘Model Revolution’ is all
about (Section 2). Then we inquire whether it can be interpreted as achieving the clas-
sical ideal of science (Section 3). The subsequent Sections will contain some critical
reflections that form the body of this paper, addressing subsequently: first, the relation
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between our theories and the beings they are about (a being is here anything that can
exist, and an actual being is anything that does exist; sometimes we drop ‘actual’ for
the sake of brevity; Section 4); secondly, the relation between our theories and the re-
sults of experiments and observations (Section 5); and, thirdly, the relation between the
models and the concepts and propositions of science (Section 6). We end with an idea
of how to complete the Model Revolution (Section 7) and briefly address a topic which
is currently in the limelight of philosophy science: scientific representation (Section 8).
2 The Model Revolution at Stanford
About half a century ago at Stanford University, in the United States of America,
Patrick Suppes and collaborators published, in two papers in Journal for Rational Me-
chanics and Analysis, a revolutionary axiomatisation of a scientific theory, namely clas-
sical particle mechanics Newtonian-style.2 Until Suppes’ arrived on the stage of phi-
losophy, an axiomatisation of a theory was generally understood in the same sense
as this gradually became to be understood in Logic since the appearance of Frege’s
Begriffschrift in 1979. During the Interbellum, that understanding had been forcefully
promulgated by the Logical-Positivistic philosophers of the Vienna Circle; it was in-
spired by exciting new developments in Logic at the time, which had started in the
course of the 19th Century (Frege, Schro¨der, Russell, Hilbert and others).3
In order to characterise some scientific theory T rigorously, as it is presented in some
prominent monograph or review article widely used and referred to by scientists, one
had to proceed as follows.4
(A) Erect an elementary formal languageLT (finite lexicon, LEX(LT), quantification only
over all, possibly different sorts of objects, no quantification over predicates;
schemata with sentence-variables might be permitted), its lexicon including all
predicates that express the ‘fundamental concepts’ of T. The set SENT(LT) of the
sentences of LT is defined inductively in the usual manner.5
(B) Erect a formal-deductive apparatus in order to be able to reason rigorously in
LT, i.e. to prove theorems (this fixes the deduction-relation between sentences,
abbreviated as usual by: `).
(C) Collect a number of sentences from SENT(LT) in set AX(T); they are the axioms of
T and should be formalisations of the postulates, principles and laws that charac-
terise T and are considered not to be deducible from other postulates, principles
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and laws in T. Then pentuple〈
LEX(LT), SENT(LT), AX(T), T, `〉 (1)
is a formal-deductive system, by definition the formalisation of T, where T is the
deductive closure of the axioms:6
T ≡ {ϕ ∈ SENT(LT) | AX(T) ` ϕ} . (2)
Of course one requires that T be consistent.
Steps (A)–(C) can be taken formathematical and scientific theories alike7; the next steps
are for scientific theories only and thus distinguish these from mathematical ones.
(D) Distinguish in the lexicon ofLT (A) theoretical and observational predicates in order
to connect (1) to the results of experiments and observations, e.g. measurements,
and collect these predicates in sets TH(LT) and OBS(LT), respectively, which
thus are both proper subsets of LEX(LT). The axioms of T (2) containing only
theoretical predicates are called theoretical postulates and those containing both
theoretical and observational predicates — and thus connecting them — are cor-
respondence postulates. Sentences of LT consisting of entirely observational predi-
cates, so-called observation sentences, are in principle (but not always in practice)
open to verification or falsification, or both; that is to say, whether an observa-
tion sentence is true or false can, in principle, be determined just by performing
the relevant observation. To make this possible, the observational sub-language of
LT, which contains by definition only all observation sentences without quan-
tifiers, is interpreted (in the standard logical sense) in a specified domain DT of
observable objects (events, things) deemed relevant for T; this also provides, via
the correspondence postulates, a so-called partial interpretation of the theoretical
sentences.
(E) Let Ot(T) ⊂ SENT(LT) be the set of observation sentences verified by scientists
until historical time t that are relevant for T; they are about the members of do-
main DT (see D). Call formal-deductive system (1) observationally adequate at t iff
T (2) is (consistent and) every established empirical truth relevant for T— i.e. ev-
ery verified observation sentence in Ot(T) — is a member of T8; in other words,
iff
Ot(T) ⊂ T ⊂ SENT(LT) . (3)
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Thus human observations of observable objects, expressed in LT constitute the con-
nexion between (i) formal-deductive system (1), which is constructed by us, human be-
ings (as is T), and (ii) the concrete actual beings that T is supposed to be about, of which
at most some (but certainly not all) are constructed by us. This observation-nexus cod-
ifies the empirical essence of science: without it, there is no science. When the content
of Ot(T) grows more varied (difficult to express formally) whilst formal-deductive
system (1) remains observationally adequate (3), it also becomes better confirmed. If a
number of repeatedly verified sentences in Ot(T) turn out to be inconsistent with T,
then system (1) is no longer observationally adequate (E); then it has been empirically
falsified: Ot(T) ∩ T 6= Ot(T), which indeed contradicts (3).
Let us call this answer to the question what theoretical scientific knowledge consists
in (the kind of knowledge acquired by science that is stored in theories9) the Formal-
Linguistic View (alsomisleadingly known as ‘the syntactic view’), henceforthL-View for
brevity. The rigorous reconstrual of T on the L-View we summarise in the following
octuple:〈
LEX(LT), SENT(LT), AX(T), OBS(LT), TH(LT), T, `, Ot(T)
〉
, (4)
where
LEX(LT) = OBS(LT) ∪ TH(LT) ∪ MATH(LT) (5)
is the lexicon of LT. If LT contains object-names, we throw the names of observable
objects in OBS(LT) and those of unobservable objects in TH(LT) so that LEX(LT) indeed
exhausts the union of the three sets in (5). The third set, MATH(LT), contains the purely
mathematical vocabulary; how much mathematics a scientific employs differs from
theory to theory and therefore also MATH(LT) and AX(T) will differ.
The required consistency (C) of T implies that the part of T containing only obser-
vation sentences is also consistent and thus has a model. In the final and most sophis-
ticated version of the L-View developed by the Logical Positivists it was required that
this observational part of Tmust have a finitemodel.10
The L-View went down due to an accumulation of internal problems and of ex-
ternal criticism — lege infra. In his seminal review article ‘The Search for Philosophic
Understanding of Scientific Theories’, F. Suppe [1974] has described the magnificent
rise and fall of this ancien re´gime. According to some, this programme has ended in
failure, and actually was doomed ab ovo—although this last addition requires a crush-
ing amount of wisdom with hindsight; others find priceless pearls of philosophical
insight in the remains.
Patrick Suppes was, like the Logical Positivists, inspired by exciting then-new de-
velopments in Logic, e.g. the rise of Tarskian model theory in the 1950ies and 1960ies.
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When he axiomatised classical particle mechanics Newtonian-style, he did not follow
steps (A)–(E) above of the L-View: he did not create a formal language, he did not
describe his deductive apparatus explicitly, he did not erect a formal-deductive system
(1), and he did not subdivide predicates into theoretical and observational ones. He
did not obtain anything like octuple (4). What Suppes did do when construing scien-
tific theory T rigorously was something we reconstruct in a manner that will invite
comparison with Steps (A)–(E) of the L-View.
(a) Adopt the informal language of axiomatic set-theory (e.g. Zermelo’s theory of
1908 with the axiom of choice, ZC) — its formalised version is L∈; it consists of
only set-variables and its lexicon contains no names and a single primitive dyadic
predicate, the membership-relation (∈); the variables can be expanded with ‘pri-
mordial elements’ aka Urelementen (German).
(b) Adopt elementary predicate logic as the background deductive apparatus in or-
der to be able to reason rigorously in L∈ (prove theorems).
(c) (c.i) Typify the fundamental concepts in T set-theoretically (whether they are
properties, relations, functions, operations, etc. and what their domains and co-
domains are) and (c.ii) express the postulates, principles and laws that charac-
terise T set-theoretically; (c.iii) obtain a set-theoretical predicate — frequently
called a Suppes-predicate; call its set-extension T , which then consists of exactly
the sets that are structures meeting the Suppes-predicate — also referred to as
models. Whence Suppes’ slogan: To axiomatise a theory is to define a set-theoretical
predicate.11
(d) —.
(e) LetDt(T) be the set of data structures that are obtained until historical time t from
themeasurement-results of experiments or observations relevant for T, which are
extracted from ‘the phenomena’ that T is supposed to save. Call T observation-
ally adequate at t iff for every data structure D ∈ Dt(T), there is some structure
(model) S ∈ T such that D is embeddable in S, where ‘embeddability’ is broadly
construed as some morphism from D into (some part of) S.12
For the sake of rigour, we emphasise that first one has to prove the existence of a
convenient set, such as Vω+g (a tiny tip of the cumulative hierarchy V until ordinal
level ω + g, where g is the number googol13), in order to guarantee the existence of
set-extension T by the Axiom of Separation, which then licences the Suppes-predicate,
say τ(·), to grab in Vω+g:
T ≡ {S ∈ Vω+g | τ(S)} , (6)
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so that T ∈ Vω+g and therefore T ⊂ Vω+g. When asked to reconstruct some scientific
theory, one can simply begin with step (c) and forget steps (a) and (b) because they are
always the same. For the axioms of set-theory one takes those of Zermelo’s ZC, because
on their basis one can construct all mathematics that science needs and ever will need.
The embeddability-relation (e) constitutes the connexion between (i) theory T and
(ii) the phenomena that T is supposed to describe, to explain or to predict. To save
the phenomena is to embed the data structures. The nexus between (i) and (ii) codifies
the empirical essence of science: without it, there simply is no science-as-we-know-it.
When the content of DT(T) grows more varied (difficult to express formally) whilst T
remains observationally adequate, T becomes better confirmed. If a number of repeat-
edly obtained data structures in Dt(T) are not embeddable into any structure in T ,
then T is no longer observationally adequate (e); then T has been falsified.
This first sketch of science is, as Suppes warned, not the most accurate picture in
which every relevant aspect of science finds a home; more accurate is a hierarchy of
structures with the bare data structures at one end and general theory-structures at the
other.14 We call this view the Informal-Structural View— henceforth S-View for brevity
— and the following ordered pair is the reconstrual of T, to be compared with octuple
(4) of the L-View:〈
T , Dt(T)
〉
. (7)
Today it seems to have replaced the ancien re´gime largely. The Model Revolution has
succeeded.
Why did the Model Revolution succeed? Why has the S-View replaced the L-
View? For at least six (related) reasons.
I. The firstwas: internal problems raised by the execution of the L-View and exter-
nal criticism of its assumptions, notably the assumption of subdividing the vocabulary
of every scientific theory clearly in an observational and a theoretical part.15
II. Continous with reason I is that the formalisation of scientific theories has been
of little help to solve all sorts of philosophical problems about science and raised by
science. On the contrary, it evoked all sorts of logical problems that had little do to
with the philosophical problems concerning science. Thus B.C. van Fraassen:
The scholastic logistical distinctions that the logical positivists produced — ob-
servational and theoretical vocabulary, Craig reductions, Ramsey sentences, first-
order axiomatisable theories, projectible predicates, disposition terms, and all the
unholy rest of it — hadmoved usmilles milles de toute habitation scientifique, isolated
in our own abstract dreams.16
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III. To execute steps (c) and (e) of theS-View has turned out to be very much easier
than executing steps (A)–(E) of the L-View. The key observation here is due to Sup-
pes: one does not need to formalise in order to be rigorous, for the informal rigour
of mathematics, i.e. of set-theory, is just as rigorous as formal rigour is.17 Another
slogan of Suppes: Mathematics for the philosophy of science, not meta-mathematics. Ax-
iomatic set-theory has turned out to be extremely convenient for characterising scien-
tific theories. Theories of physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, economy, politics,
psychology, linguistics and more have come under its Alexandrian sway. As far as
reconstruing scientific theories rigorously is concerned, this programme has met with
unprecedented success.18
IV. The S-View puts the model center stage, rather than the theory. In his classic
paper ‘A Comparison of the Meaning and Use of Models in Mathematics and the Em-
pirical Sciences’, which appeared in this very journal about half a century ago, Suppes
[1960] argued that his models (i.e. set-structures inhabiting V) could be taken as what
working scientists mean by ‘model’. Observing further that scientists generally are model-
builders rather than axiomatisors and theorem-provers, theS-View seemed to make much
more sense of the practice of science than the L-View. During the past decades, N.D.
Cartwright and her followers have promulgated a less mathematical and more prag-
matic and practical oriented approach to scientific modeling; this approach is a line of
development within, or at least given birth to by, the S-View.19
V. The L-View makes a theory heavily dependent on a particular formulation in a
specific language (LT), whereas theS-View provides a characterisation of T that is not
tied up to a particular formulation (see further Section ??).
VI. The part of mathematics that any scientific theory employs needs to be isolated,
formalised, axomatised and added to T in the L-View. The S-View disgards this all
and can discard it because, as we asserted earlier, all the mathematics that any scientific
theory needs and ever will need can be erected in ZC, which marks our domain of
discourse in which we (can) characterise every scientific theory.20
3 Aristotelian Ideals
In his The Foundations of Mathematics of 1957, E.W. Beth provided a modern charac-
terisation of Aristotle’s ‘apodeictic science’, which has been advocated by the likes of
Euclid, Descartes, Arnauld, Newton, Leibniz, Pascal, Kant, Bolzano, Husserl, Frege,
Peano, Lesniewski, Russell, Hilbert, Carnap, Tarski, Beth, Montague, . . .21 W.R. de
Jong and A. Betti [2008] have extended this characterisation and baptised it ‘the clas-
sical ideal of science’. We shall provide a succinct formulation tailored for present
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purposes. A warning is in order: this classical ideal of science was supposed to be
more encompassing than what we nowadays call ‘science’ (to which the S-View (7) is
geared), and certainly than what we now call ‘natural science’ (to which the L-View
(4) is geared).
We consider an ordered pair
Π ≡ 〈Πp, Πc〉 (8)
of a set of propositions (Πp) and a set of concepts (Πc). Let us first call Π (8) a classical
scientific theory iff it meets the following three conditions:
(α) Π is about a specific set of actual beings (objects, processes, events, entities, per-
sons, organisms, periods, structures, . . .), frequently called its domain or scope.
(β) Some concepts in Πc are fundamental; the other concepts in Πc are defined in
terms of the fundamental ones.
(γ) Some propositions inΠp are fundamental, often called the principles ofΠ; all other
propositions in Πp follow from these.
Secondly, Π (8) is a true and universal and necessary classical scientific theory iff Π is a
classical scientific theory (α–γ) and meets in addition the following two conditions:
(δ) All propositions in Πp are true.
(ε) All propositions in Πp are universal and necessary.
In the next two conditions, the existence of actual epistemic agents are needed. Call
E our Epistemic community, which consists of all actual human beings having a mini-
mum level of scientific education and are sound of mind). Thirdly, call ordered pair
〈Π, E〉 a classical ideal of science iff Π (8) meets conditions (α–ε) and meets in addition
the following two conditions:
(ζ) Every proposition inΠp is known by somemembers of E; every non-fundamental
proposition in Πp is known by members of E through its proof.
(η) Every concept in Πc is known by some members of E; every defined concept in
Πc is known by members of E through its definition.
Notice that if Πp contains infinitely many propositions, conditions (ζ–η) will never
be met, unless there are also infinitely many epistemic agents, or unless an omni-
scient entity is posited and granted membership in E (God, as Bolzano did), or unless
‘known’ is replaced with ‘knowable’.
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Notice too that the classical ideal of science (α–η) says nothing about the relation
betweenΠ (8) and the results of experiments and observations, notablymeasurements;
precisely in this relation we would, certainly since the Scientific Revolution, seek the
essence of what we now call science. Hence even if some set Π fits the classical profile
(α–ε), we should not conclude that Π qualifies as a piece of what we today would call
‘scientific knowledge’, because something essential has been left out of that classical
profile.
De Jong & Betti [2008] point out that being evident for a proposition, as a guarantee
for knowing it (ζ), was an indisputable requirement for the fundamental propositions
(principles) until the second half of the 19th Century (!) when it comes to geometry,
whereafter the decline of this requirement set in. Beth also adds the requirement that
themeaning of the concepts inΠc must be clear so as to not require any further explica-
tion.22 Suppes [1992] has pointed out that Aristotle did not provide a single example
of a piece of science that qualifies as achieving the classical ideal by his own lights
(ibid., p. 215); the very first piece of science that qualified was Euclid’s Elements. We
would classify Euclidean geometry today as a piece of pure mathematics. What ar-
guably qualifies as the very first realisation of the classical ideal of science, by our cur-
rent lights, is Archimedes’ theory of static equilibria, although his level of conceptual
and axiomatic explicitness does not come close to that of Euclid’s (ibid., pp. 217–219).
Since both the L-View (4) and the S-View (7) are views of scientific theories, rather
than of science, and both views are neither about the epistemic status of theories (know-
ledge) nor about their epistemic relation to us (knowing), they seem epistemically neu-
tral. In spite of this, there is a point in ascertaining whether theL-View and theS-View
meet conditions (α–ζ), if only to understandwhy they fail if they fail. Before we do this,
we remark that both Views also are neutral, first, about whether scientific theories are
true or false, and, secondly, about whether scientific theories are necessary and uni-
versal, so that both Views fail to meet conditions (δ) and (ε). They fail, however, by
remaining silent about these issues, not because they cannot be extended so as to meet
these conditions.
Clearly formal-deductive system (1) of the L-View meets conditions (α–γ) and is
therefore a classical scientific theory when we take the primitive predicates of LT to
express the fundamental concepts in Πc and syntactic definability as ‘definability’ (in
β), and when we take the sentences of LT to express the propositions in Πp and the
axioms of T (2) to express the principles in Πp (in γ). Whether T (6) of the S-View
meets conditions (α–γ) is highly problematic, because T is not a set of propositions
and concepts (but a set of set-structures) whilst the predicate ‘classical ideal of science’
only applies such sets (Π). However, if we consider the set-theoretical renderings of the
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fundamental concepts of T as expressions of the fundamental concepts inΠc, and if we
consider the characterisation conjuncts in the definition of the set-theoretical predicate
whose set-extension is T (6) as expressions of the fundamental propositions in Πp,
then there is a case to be made for the claim that T also qualifies as a classical scientific
theory.
The condition of the classical ideal of science of which we have so far remained
silent is the beings condition (α). We have taken it for granted that in theL-View (4), the
specification of the subject-matter of T proceeds semantically: whatever the variables
of LT range over and to whatever the predicates of LT apply are the beings that T
is about (unintended models of T (2) now appear at the horizon, we quickly change
course). For the S-View we cannot take something similar for granted, because T (6)
does not consist of propositions that are about something; the set-theoretical predicate
τ(·) that defines T is an open sentence inL∈ and therefore is about sets only, inhabitants
of V, not of the world. But surely scientific theories are about concrete actual beings in
the world and not about abstract sets in the domain of discourse V of set-theory.
To conclude, the only good news for propounders of the classical ideal of science
is that formal-deductive system (1) of the L-View (4) qualifies as a classical scientific
theory. Bad news is that the classical ideal of science says nothing about the relation
between theory and observation, whereas precisely here resides the essence of what
we call science. There have been historical attempts to change the characterisation of
the classical ideal of science so as to include observations and measurements, but that
will then be a characterisation of a different concept, as different as Galilean-Newtonian
physics was from its Aristotelian-scholastic progenitors. Perhaps one could argue that
the specific failure of T of theS-View (7) to qualify as a classical scientific theory (α–γ)
does not spell trouble for the classical ideal of science, but rather spells trouble for the
S-View. This is indeed what we shall argue in the next Section, where we expound
our first critical reflection on the Model Revolution at Stanford.
4 Deep Diving for the Beings
In the previous Section, we emphasised that the set-theoretical predicate τ(·) that de-
fines T is an open sentence in the language of pure set-theory (L∈); therefore it is lit-
erally about sets and not about anything else. Furthermore, theory T (6) is a set of
structures in V. How can any scientific theory T thus reconstructed be about any con-
crete being in the world, say B (of ‘Being’)? Ontological variable ‘B’ may have as values
our solar system, Einstein’s brain, the French Revolution, a human cell, the Big Bang, a
Uranium nucleus, the entire universe, themarket economy of Russia after the fall of the
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Berlin wall, the population of lions and zebras in Kenia, an earthquake in Turkey, and
so forth — all concrete actual beings in the wide sense in which we are using this term.
The fact that the S-View does not meet the beings condition (α) of the classical ideal
of science counts against this View, not against the classical ideal. Yet Suppes argued,
as we have also mentioned previously, that his set-structures could be taken as what
working scientists mean by ‘model’, which is exactly the reason why the structures are
aka models (Section 2). But any model in science is a model of some concrete actual being
B. What we know about the modelled beings we know via our scientific models and
theories; the epistemic aim of science is the production of knowledge of actual beings.
About this putative connexion, between the model S ∈ T and actual beings (B), the
S-View passes over in silence.
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Figure 1: The Informal-Structural View (7), or S-View
Do beings actually enter the picture in the S-View at all? They do when we draw
a picture (see Figure 1). There we can find a place for the beings. On the one hand
they are what all experiments and all observations in science are about; measurements
are the result of the interaction between concrete actual beings and our instruments of
experimentation and observation, which are also concrete actual beings. On the other
hand, their role in the S-View is not one played somewhere on stage for all of us to
spot and to marvel at, let alone in the limelight drawing attention, but somewhere
backstage, as somehow responsible for the phenomena, from which data structures D
are extracted, because the phenomena are the result of interaction between concrete
actual beings and us, human beings. In contrast, the data-structures are present on
stage, showing off in the limelight. As soon as some data structure D is obtained, we
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can forget all about the concrete actual beings B at hand, or so it seems. The S-View
says next to nothing about how the modelsS (the theory T) are related to the concrete
beings B they are supposed to provide knowledge of. As we concluded above, the
S-View passes over in silence.
The best one could say is that a data structure D seems to act as simulacrum of the
concrete actual being B, because D is a set-theoretical representation of the qualitative
results of experiments or observations extracted from some phenomenon that neces-
sarily involves B; the embeddability relation between data structure D and the model
S ∈ T then acts as the simulacrum of the nexus between the abstract model (structure,
theory) and the concrete actual being B. But this is not good enough. We don’t want
simulacra. We want the real thing. Come on.
We shall presently return to this Problem of the Lost Beings; for now we focus our
attention on the data structures: for as soon as we have data structures, then, besides
the Problem of the Lost Beings, no other problems will appear? Not quite, as we shall
see in the next Section.23
5 The Sea of Stories
Suppes’ larger programme in the philosophy of science encompassesMeasurement Theory,
which concerns the following. We begin by stating the obvious truth that all our ob-
servations are qualitative; our sensory organs are not pieces of measurement apparatus
whose numerical results we somehow read off ‘inside our minds’. The world we see
around us seems to consist broadly speaking of mostly medium-sized dry material ob-
jects, moving slowly about or staying put. Science teaches us that everything we see is
the result of electro-magnetic interaction between material objects and our eyes via a
narrow window in the spectrum of all electro-magnetic radiation (400–800 nm), above
a threshold intensity (below which our eyes do not register anything) and below some
upper bound (above which our eyes burn).24 Now, a very specific kind of observa-
tions, obtained in certain contexts we call scientific experiments, we choose to represent
numerically by using pieces of measurement apparatus, and we call these numerical
representations data or measurements. Says Suppes [1960: 297]:
The maddeningly diverse and complex experience which constitutes an experi-
ment is not the entity which is directly compared with a model of a theory. Drastic
assumptions of all sorts are made in reducing the experimental experience, as I shall
term it, to a simple entity ready for comparison with a model of the theory.
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That simple entity is the data structure. From the 1950ies onwards Suppes synthesised
various approaches to the problem of under what conditions we are justified to repre-
sent qualitative observations quantitatively, i.e. numerically. This is what Measurement
Theory is all about.25 For example, by first characterising the binary relation ‘is heavier
than’ pertaining to qualitative observations on a pair of scales, and then proving that
this relation can be represented mathematically by ‘is larger than’ on the real num-
bers, one is justified in introducing mass as a real-number-valued physical magnitude.
Then it makes sense to say, for instance, that one mass is 3.74 as large as another. To
contrast, one cannot characterise the binary relation ‘is in love with’ such that a similar
representation theorem can be proved, which means there is no justification in say-
ing that Charles Bovary loved Emma 3.74 as much as Rodolphe Boulanger and Le´on
Dupuis did. To utter these words is not to say anything; it is to utter nonsense.
For the sake of exposition, let us consider the numerical data set
D(n, k) ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k} ×Qn , (9)
where n, k ∈ N, which consists of (n + 1)-tuples, 〈j, q1, q2, . . . , qn〉, with j running
from 1 to k, so that k is the cardinality of D(n, k). The data set D(n, k), which is set-
theoretically a relation, forms the following data structure (data structures are always
relation structures26):
D(n, k) ≡ 〈N, Q, D(n, k) 〉 . (10)
Logically speaking, every conceivable data set can be found in an actual experi-
ment, but not every data set is found. Call the ones that have been found in some
experiment or observation an actual data set. We now face two problems, which we
address successively.
1◦. Which data sets of all possible ones are actual? When we want to express ourselves
formally, there seems to be no other way than to accept in L∈ ‘actual’ as a primitive
monadic predicate of data sets. For suppose we try to provide a definition: a data set
is actual iff it is obtained by performing some experiment or observation. The definiens
stands as much in need of explication as the definiendum: the notion of ‘a performed
experiment’ is as clear, or as obscure, as what an actual data set is. Etc. A simple
pragmatic and informal yet defeasible sufficient condition for a data set to be actual is
as follows: if a data set is published in some respectable scientific journal, then it is
actual. Further, a data set is actual only if it involves an actual concrete being.
2◦. Suppose we have some actual data set. For which scientific theory is this data set
supposed to be relevant?
Consider, for the sake of concreteness, a data set D(2, 10) of type (9) — n = 2 and
k = 10 — and the following four simple physical experiments.
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(i) We measure the length (l′) of the image on a screen of a little wooden stick we
hold in front of a positive lens outside its focal distance; we also measure the
length (l) of the stick itself; we have ten sticks. In this manner we obtain ten
ordered triples of type 〈j, l, l′〉 ∈N×Q2, which we collect in data set Dlens(2, 10).
(ii) We measure the direct current (I) and the voltage (U) over one resistor ten times,
for different voltages; then we obtain ten triples of type 〈j, I,U〉 ∈N×Q2, which
we collect in data set Delec(2, 10).
(iii) Wemeasure the traveled distance (d) of a free falling coin in vacuum at ten points
in time (τ) before it hits the ground; then we obtain ten triples of type 〈j, τ, d〉 ∈
N×Q2, which we collect in data set Dfall(2, 10).
(iv) Finally, we measure the height of a mercury column (h) at different instances
during the day (t); then we obtain ten triples of type 〈j, t, h〉 ∈N×Q2, which we
collect in data set DHg(2, 10).
Again, for which scientific theories are these data sets supposed to be relevant?
Clearly the answer is: (i) Dlens(2, 10) is relevant for ray optics, (ii) Delec(2, 10) for the
theory of electrical circuits, (iii) Dfall(2, 10) for Galilei’s theory of kinematics, but also
for Newtonian particle mechanics, and (iv) DHg(2, 10) for meteorological theories. The
problem is that we cannot come to know this by staring at these data sets, because all
four of them comprise ten ordered pairs of positive rational numbers. A story has to be
told about how and in which scientific context the data sets are obtained. Thus all actual data
structures float in a sea of stories, that need to be told in order to know which data are
relevant for which theory. Without such stories we cannot even begin to address the
relation between theory and observation.
Are there any essential ingredients every such story must have? We answer in the
affirmative. Every story must tell us, first, which concrete actual beings the measure-
ments pertain to, and, secondly, what is measured, which involves a specification of the
units. Our presentation of the results of the four simple experiments (i)–(iv) above was
in this sense incomplete: we should have added the relevant units. Notice however
that providing units does not tell the complete story, because the ordered pairs in both
(iii) Dfall(2, 10) and (iv) DHg(2, 10) have units of time (second occupant) and length
(third occupant). Confusing Dfall(2, 10) and DHg(2, 10) would lead to a refutation of
Newtonian particle mechanics and to doomsday-weather forecasts.
In telling the stories of how and in which contexts experimental results are ob-
tained, we use language, we use words that express concepts and we use sentences
that express propositions. When we arrive, by telling some story, with our data struc-
ture in the realm of theories, we know for which scientific theory or theories the data
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structure is relevant. But when we only have rigorous construals of all scientific the-
ories in accordance with the S-View (7), to which of the sets of set-structures should
we go in order to find a structure that embeds an obtained data structure? TheS-View
lacks the resources to tell the necessary stories: language. Call this the Problem of the
Unavailable Stories. This problem leads us to the next Section, where we inquire into
the conceptual and propositional content of the set-theoretical construals; it will give
rise to our next critical reflection on the S-View.
6 Concepts and Propositions at Bay
We call to mind again that the epistemic aim of science is to provide knowledge of con-
crete actual beings; call theoretical scientific knowledge the kind of knowledge obtained
by scientific inquiry that is stored in theories, and hence somehow in the models that
constitute the theory according to the S-View (7). A necessary condition any model S
must pass in order to be considered as a piece of theoretical scientific knowledge about
a particular kind of concrete actual being B is that S should embed all the relevant
actual data structures obtained by observing B or performing experiments with B. But
what does set-structure S, or a theory for that matter (T 3 S) say about B? Where
has the conceptual and propositional content of the scientific theory T, as used by sci-
entists, gone to when reconstructed as T? Call this the Problem of the Lost Content.27
Saying that force in classical mechanics is, first, a real 3-vector, f ∈ R3, is saying some-
thing about the concept of force, namely that it has a direction in R3, which is its direc-
tion in 3-dimensional space when and only when we take R3 to represent 3-dimensional
space, and, secondly, that force has a strength, or magnitude, when and only when we
take length ‖f‖ ∈ R+ to represent this strength. But these explications go beyond the
set-theoretical sentence ‘f ∈ R3’, because they involve the concepts of direction in 3-
dimensional space and strength, whose content clearly goes beyond the language of pure
set-theory (L∈, in which we can only talk about pure sets).
Furthermore, where and how does truth fit in the S-View? If there are ‘truth-
makers’ of propositions that are somehow determined by means of S (or of T), then
surely they are, or somehow reside in, the concrete actual being B that S (or T) is sup-
posed to be about. For if B is neither the truth-maker nor involved in the truth-making
of sentences about B, then the concept of truth gets dissociated from the actual concrete
beings, and such a concept of truth does not seem to be the the concept of truth that
is used and understood in science. Surely in science truths and falsehoods are truths
and falsehoods about the world. What else could they be about? Well, how does this
precisely work, then, according to the S-View?
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Once again, theS-View passes over in silence, this time about the questionwhat the
relation is between the structures that constitute the theory and the beings the theory is
supposed to be about (the Problem of the Lost Beings of Section 4 re-surfaces). Perhaps
there is a profound wisdom in this silence. For what would count as possible answer
to these questions?
Evidently, when we are asking of how this precisely works, we are asking for more
words. We are asking for sentences that express propositions about being B, and these
propositions surely involve concepts that express, presumably, properties of B and
relations between B and other beings. Let modelS ∈ T be supposed to be about being
B. Those propositions and concepts expressed by the sentences and words that we are
asking for will be the truly ontological ones, because they are ‘directly’ about B, about B
an sich, as B really is, in and of itself, without any mediation by the products of science
(modelS, theory T). These propositions and concepts are expressed in what we, then,
may call the ontological language of being B (Lont). Next Lont somehow has to be related
to L∈, in particular to the part of L∈ that defines S and T (6), in order to establish the
desired connexion between S and B. Certainly we would like to have true sentences
of Lont about B; all ontological truths about B may be said to express our ontological
knowledge of B. When ψ(B) ∈ SENT(Lont) is a sentence is about B that is made true by
B, and ‘|=’ abbreviates this truth-maker relation, then what we are after is to fill in the
dots in the following expression:
B |= ψ(B) iff . . . . . . . . . . . . (in L∈) . (11)
But how are we going to find out whether ψ(B) is true or false? By contemplation in
the proverbial armchair? By thinking deeply and uncompromisingly about B? Or by
combining reason with observation and imagination in that flabbergastingly success-
ful manner that forms the beating heart of science? The second option surely seems
promising. But recall that propositons and concepts expressed in Lont were supposed
to make sense of what science tells us about B. We were inquiring about the relation
between S and B. The ‘ontological theory’ we were after, in order to provide us with
the desired ontological knowlegde of B, gives rise either to a doubtful programme of
armchair science or to a scientific research project. In the last-mentioned case we are
eating our tail. What went wrong?
Something went wrong in the beginning: we should not want to have Lont in the
first place, in order to talk about B. But is this because B as it really is, in and of itself, is
epistemically inaccessible for us, as Kant would have it, so that the idea of considering
Lont is a senseless exercise? Or when B as it really is, in and of itself, somehow is
epistemically accessible for us, do we not already have some part of the language of
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science to talk about B, namely the language of the scientific theory T that is supposed
to be literally about B, as Ampe`re countenanced? Is not T supposed to provide us with
knowledge of concrete actual beings expressed by true and justified sentences in T?
If everything we want to know about B is however not provided by T, then we must
engage in more scientific research about B in order to refine or to extend or to replace
T. What else is there to do? And this lands us in our original problem: a set-structure
S ∈ T is defined in L∈ and therefore cannot tell us anything about Bwhilst T is all that
science will ever be able to produce on the current construal.
Perhaps we have to take a closer look at Suppes’ arguments for his claim that his
models (S ∈ T) can be taken to be what working scientists call ‘models’. What we
have not mentioned so far is that Suppes was specifically inspired by Tarski’s creation
of Model Theory in Logic and that this has been the basis for Suppes’ claim.28 Perhaps
we find a clue here. Let’s see.
Tarski’s conception of a model is, properly construed and denoted, a triple
M = 〈S, R, |= 〉 , (12)
consisting of a set-structure S living in the domain of meta-discourse (V whenever
the meta-theory is also some set-theory, which usually is the case), a Reference-map R
sending terms in a formal language L to items ofS and an inductively defined map |=
from SENT(L) to the semantic values ‘true’ and ‘false’ (also known under various other
names: satisfaction, truth-map, semantic valuation).
M is a model of T iff 〈S, R〉 |= T . (13)
We have all learned this in our Logic courses. The relevant Suppesian model here
is the set-structure S, not M (12). Suppes has argued that S can be identified with
what is called a ‘model’ by working scientists. So Suppes discards the semantics (R,
|=); this is why the name ‘semantic view’ for Suppes’ view is not just a misnomer but
a terminological howler. But then what if we amend the S-View by taking the full
triplesM (12) aboard rather than only S? We then could take the set of all of them as
the reconstruction of T. The ensuing view of scientific theories could be truly called
the Semantic View:
T = {M | 〈S,R〉 |= T ∧ S ∈ Vω+g} , (14)
to be combined with verified relevant observation sentences Ot(T) or actual relevant
data structures Dt(T). Sentences and truth are now waiting just around the corner,
ready to be amalgamated into the proper view of what a scientific theory is.
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This T (14) however does not seem to be what we want, because a Tarskian model
M is a model of a formalised theory, of a set of sentences in a formal language, such as T (2)
is. Of all admissible truth-maps the one is chosen that makes, in collaboration with a
reference-map R (from terms in the language to elements of V), the axioms of T true.
From T (14) we see that the Tarskianmodel presupposes part of theL-View on theories
(4). The set of all triples M (12) such that they are all models of a formal theory T is
denoted as: Mod(T). Then T ⊂ Mod(T), but if we re-define Mod(T) as to permit only
structures in Vω+g, as in (14), then
T = Mod(T) . (15)
In order to see Mod(T) as the proper reconstrual of scientific theory T, we first need
T. But what is T a formalisation of? If a formalisation of T, then we are back in the
L-View.
Oneway to avoid these problems is as follows. We return to theS-View (7) consider
the extension T (6) not as the ultimate but as the penultimate step towards a rigorous
construal of scientific theory T. In order to prepare for the ultimate step, we consider
one of Van Fraassen’s arguments in favour of his version of the semantic view (cf.
reason VI at the end of Section 2):
In any tragedy, we suspect some crucial mistake was made at the very beginning.
The mistake, I think, was to confuse a theory with the formulation of a theory in a
particular language.
(. . .)
Words are like co-ordinates. If I present a theory in English, there is a transforma-
tion which produces an equivalent description in German. There are also transfor-
mations which produce distinct but equivalent English descriptions. This would be
easiest to see if I were so conscientious as to present the theory in axiomatic form;
for then it could be rewritten so that the body of theorems remains the same, but
a different subset of those theorems is designated as the axioms, from all the rest
follows. Translation is thus analogous to co-ordinate transformation — is there a
co-ordinate-free format as well? The answer is Yes (although the banal point that I
can describe it only in words obviously remains).
(. . . )
Suppes’ idea was simple: to present a theory, we define the class of models di-
rectly, without paying any attention to questions of axiomatisability in any special
language, however relevant or logically interesting that might be.29
Van Fraassen draws a comparisonwith physical space-time theories and co-ordinate
systems on space-time. For centuries such theories were formulated in terms of co-
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ordinates, which were taken to be labels of space-time points. In order to express that
choosing a particular co-ordinate system is a pragmatic issue without any physical
relevance, laws of nature formulated using a particular co-ordinate system were re-
quired to have the same ’physical content’ when a co-ordinate transformation was
performed on the laws. After Einstein had used Riemann’s concept of a differen-
tiable manifold in the formulation of his General Theory of Relativity, this mathemat-
ical structure was soon also used to re-formulate Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativ-
ity (Minkowski space-time, Robb space-time) and Classical Electro-Dynamics (idem),
Classical Mechanics (Galilean space-time, Newtonian space-time), without and with
his theory of universal gravitation (Newton-Cartan space-time), In the language of
Riemann’s differential geometry, it has turned out to be possible to formulate laws of
physics (that characterise a physical space-time theory)withoutmentioning co-ordinate
systems, so as to make the physical irrelevance of co-ordinate systems manifest. Hence
Van Fraassen compares the general framework of differential geometry and a differen-
tiablemanifold to the general framework of set-theory and a set-structure, respectively;
then he compares the co-ordinate-free formulation of a physical space-time theorywith
the language-free formulation of a scientific theory T through a set T of set-structures
S (6). The banal point is that we use L∈ to defineS and T . So L∈ has nothing to do with
the language used by scientists in text books and review articles to characterise T but is
a mere means to characterise S and T . We then further compare a co-ordinate system
on space-time with a formulation of T, both chosen for the sake of convenience, and
transformations between co-ordinate systems with translations between formulations
of T.30
All this looks pretty appealing, especially when displayed:
differential geometry ! set-theory
differentiable manifold ! set-structure
co-ordinate-free formulation ! language-free formulation
of a space-time theory of a scientific theory
co-ordinatisation of a space-time ! formulation of a scientific theory
atlas of all co-ordinate transformations ! all formulations of a scientific theory
co-ordinate transformations ! formulation translations
There is, however, a problem.
When we formulate T rigorously — or “conscientiously”, as Van Fraassen puts it
in the quotation displayed above — as a formal-deductive system T (2), we obtain a
lexicon of a particular signature, which tells us how many names, how many sorts of
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variables and how many primitive predicates of every adicity there are. This will fix
the signature (of the structure S) of the models of T (12), that is, of all the models in
Mod(T), or so it seems. A model having a different signature cannot, then, be a model
of T ? If we translate L into another language, say L′ (every item of the lexicon of L is
translated in terms of the lexicon of L′), and choose axioms in L′ whose deductive clo-
sure yields the formal theory T′, such that all translated axioms of T become theorems
of T′, and conversely, then “the body of theorems remains the same” (Van Fraassen,
above): T = T′. But since in general the signature of L′ is different from that of L, the
models of T′ and of Twill be distinct, so the classes of their models are disjoint:
Mod(T) ∩Mod(T′) = ∅ . (16)
Yet (16) seems incompatible with T = T′, for if T = T′, then Mod(T) = Mod(T′).
Right? Wrong. On the basis of the L-View (4), it does not follow from T = T′ that
the theories are identical because to draw that conclusion the lexicons have to coincide
too. For the L-View, the formulation counts. Since the lexicons of L and L′ are dif-
ferent, the signatures of the models of T and T′ are different, so that indeed Mod(T)∩
Mod(T′) = ∅. A more explicit notation such as ‘Mod(T, LEX(L))’ would have pre-
vented the fallacious inference from T = T′ to Mod(T, LEX(L)) = Mod(T′, LEX(L′)).
But now notice that there is a straightforwardmanner to amend theL-View slightly
so as to meet Van Fraassen’s challenge to provide language-free characterisation of
scientific theory T. We could simply universally quantify away the lexicon from (4)
and drop uno icto the distinction between ‘observation’ and ‘theoretical’ predicates.
Specifically, we identify a theory as a class of all and only inter-translatable formal the-
ories; loosely and symbolically:
AT ≡
{〈T′, LEX(L′)〉 | ∃ g : LEX(LT) → LEX(L′) : g[T] = T′ and
∃ ginv : LEX(L′) → LEX(LT) : ginv[T′] = T
}
,
(17)
where bijectivemap g is a translation between the lexicons. Call now this the Formulation-
Independent Linguistic View, or [L]-View for brevity:〈AT, `, Ot(T) 〉 , (18)
where ‘AT’ alludes to ‘atlas’. An immediate consequence of (17) is that one member of
this class fixes the models of all its other members.
So the bodies of all formal theories in this class coincide; notice that it is an equivalence-
class because the relation ‘is inter-translatable to’ is an equivalence-relation; every AT
is a member of the quotient-class of the class of all elementary formal theories divided
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by the relation of inter-translatability. Then what the theory says about the world,
i.e. its propositional content, expressed in T, is invariant under translations. Hence
our characterisation (18) of T is, although not language-free, independent of any specific
formulation. The conceptual content of the theory is formulation-dependent and hence
language-dependent: it is expressed by a lexicon and lexicons change under transla-
tion.
Now, to provide a formulation-free rigorous characterisation of T, e.g. as in T (6) of
the S-View, is one way to make a rigorous characterisation formulation-independent
(as analogous to a co-ordinate-independent formulation of a physical space-time theory),
yet it is not the only way. Another way is to quantify the formulation-dependence uni-
versally away, as we just have done, and make the propositional content of a theory
independent of its formulation, i.e. of its lexicon.
For those who insist on a language-free charactersation of T nonetheless, rather than
a formulation-independent one, we point out that also in a co-ordinate-free formulation of
physical space-time theories in terms of differentiable manifolds, the co-ordinate sys-
tems are not eradicated at all. Physical space-time theories are not free of co-ordinate
systems. On the contrary, the structure of a differentiable manifold involves by defini-
tion an atlas, which is the set of all local co-ordinate systems on the open cover of the
space-time continuum; and it is in terms of these co-ordinate systems and their trans-
formations that the differentiability of the manifold is characterised. There is no such
thing as a co-ordinate-free differentiable manifold. To a certain extent the co-ordinate-
free formulation of physical laws in space-times theories is therefore a fata morgana,
because when these laws are explicated, including an explication of the concepts used
in the formulation of these laws, all co-ordinate systems will inevitably re-appear on
the stage. The independence of physical laws from co-ordinate systems used to be not
manifest because co-ordinates were mentioned in the formulation of physical laws;
this was guaranteed by imposing a co-variance requirement on physical laws under
co-ordinate transformations. In the [L]-View (18) something exactly analogous hap-
pens.
The formulation-independence ismanifest in the language-freeS-View (7). We are
now prepared to set the promised ultimate step in order to solve the Problem of the
Lost Content in theS-View. Set T consists of structuresS (6). When part of a Tarskian
model M (12), structure S fixes the signature of M. This fixes in turn the signature
of a formal language, call it LS, in which we can formulate a theory that has M as
its Tarskian model; call such a theory Th(S). We can consider the class of exactly the
theories of S:
KS ≡
{〈Th(S), LEX(LS)〉 | ∃ R : 〈S, R〉 |= Th(S) and S ∈ Vω+g } . (19)
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Do the theories in KS have the same signature, namely the one of S? Closer in-
spection reveals they do not, because every translation of member 〈Th, LEX(LS)〉 will
also be made true by 〈S,R〉. Every structure S ∈ T now comes with a class KS of
theories, having various lexicons, all of which are made true by 〈S,R〉. The following
ordered pair should then be an improvement on the S-View (7) as the construal of
what working scientists call a ‘model’:〈
S, KS
〉
. (20)
Roughly, a model is a structure and all its formulations. When we define the proposi-
tional content of S as all inter-translatable formulations, then model (20) is a structure
and its propositional content.31 Let Tτ now be the class of all such ordered pairs, where
Smeets the antecedently defined Suppes predicate τ(·) in L∈:
Tτ ≡
{〈S, KS〉 | τ(S)} . (21)
Then our improved rigorous construal of T is〈
Tτ, Dt(T)
〉
. (22)
Let us call this the Structural View, or briefly the KS-View.
The KS-View (22) is an improvement, because now we have lots of languages and
theories of S — formulations of theories if you like — which we can appeal to for lo-
cating the conceptual and propositional content of T: we now have sentences that
can be true or false; and we have the predicates of the lexicons to express concepts.
Choice of language does not matter for the propositional content of Tτ (21), as choice
of co-ordinate system does not matter for the physical content of space-time theories,
because all sets Th(S) of sentences generated by S, and made true by Tarskian model
M (12) that has S as its structure, can have wildly differing lexicons and these are all
included in Tτ (21). This solves the Problem of the Lost Content. Further, it has all the
resources to solve the Problem of the Unavailable Stories.
To recapitulate, we have begun this Section by raising the difficulty where the con-
ceptual and propositional content of scientific theory T has gone to when construed in
accordance to theS-View (7), namely as a set of set-structures defined in the language
of pure set-theory (L∈). This Problem of the Lost Content is related to the Problem of
the Lost Beings we raised earlier when we wondered where the S-View allocates the
concrete actual beings (B). For T is supposed to provide us with scientific knowledge,
in the sense of scientifically justified true propositions about concrete actual beings.
We briefly explored the possibility of an ontological language (Lont) to talk directly
about the beings (so as to solve both of the mentioned problems uno icto), but we soon
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discovered that we were eating our tail. Then we moved, inspired by Suppes’ inspira-
tion, from the Suppesian modelS to the Tarskian modelM (12). Notwithstanding the
fact that Tarskian models gave us languages to talk about abstract set-structures rather
than about the concrete actual beings (B) that T is about, we proceeded, inspired by
Van Fraassen’s analogy with co-ordinate-free characterisations of physical space-time
theories, to loosen the bond between structure (S) and formulation (notably the lexicon
of L) by incorporating translations into the L-View. This has led to the [L]-View (18),
according to which T is the set of all formal formulations of T. Then we re-introduced
formulations of theories of structures into the S-View, but in such a manner that all
formulations are incorporated that leave the propositional content of the theory in-
variant. This led to the KS-View (22), which solves the Problems of the Lost Beings, of
the Lost Content and of the Unavailable Stories.
Should we now choose the [L]-View (18) or the KS-View (22) as the best recon-
strual of scientific theories as they occur in science? In the next Section we answer this
question.
7 Towards Completion
Einstein once said that we should make our scientific theories simple but not simpler.
Mutatis mutandis for our views on scientific theories. Consider the two new views:
[L]-View :
〈AT, Ot(T) 〉 ,
KS-View :
〈
Tτ, Dt(T)
〉
,
(23)
which are both markedly different from their progenitors, the L-View (4) and the S-
View (7), respectively. Both new Views look baroque, but the [L]-View does not suffer
from the formulation-dependence that crippled its predecessor, the L-View (4), and
the Structural View; further, it suffers neither from the Problem of the Lost Content nor
from the Problem of the Lost Beings nor from the Problem of the Unavailability of the
Stories — it does suffer from other problems, that lead to the decline of the L-View (see
Section 2). The KS-View (23) also does not fall prey to the mentioned three Problems.
What should not come as a surprise is that on top of this, the gap between these
two improved views (23) is not as wide as between the L-View (4) and theS-View (7).
For from (17) and (19) we deduce:
AT = KS . (24)
Logically speaking, both new views really are two sides of the same coin. Philosoph-
ically speaking, the gap remains sufficiently wide to prefer the KS-View (22) over the
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[L]-View (18), because the starting point for this construal remains a set-theoretical
predicate τ(·) defining a type of set-structure S (the Suppesian model keeps playing
the main part), and because the formal theories and their inter-translations in KS need
never be spelled out (the formalising labour that is mandatory in the L-View need not
be performed). In the old S-View (7) the formulations are simply not there, which
is why the conceptual and propositional content of T is lost and T floats helplessly
around in the sea of stories; in the KS-View (23) they are lying there for the taking
and are officially acknowledged to be part of the full reconstrual of T. Conceptual and
propositional content can be hauled in at will and by law. Those propositions can and
should be taken as being literally about the concrete actual beings, in exactly the same
way as the proposition expressed by the Latin sentence ‘Sol lucet’ is about the Sun: we
have dived deeply for the beings and here they are.
This does not mean that we have solved the problem of how precisely the structure
S relates to the concrete actual being B, but it does mean that we have transformed the
problem so as to subsume the transformed problem under one of the major problems
of philosophy of the past century: the profound problem of how to understand the re-
lation between the word and the world. Figure 2 depicts the situation we have arrived
at.
'
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Figure 2: Beings in the KS-View (22)
About this profound problem, the KS-View (22) has little to say — we shall say
a bit about it in the next and final Section. Yet at soon as it is granted that the KS-
View on scientific theories need not solve this profound philosophical problem — as
for example propounders of the informal-structural view French and Ladyman [1999:
24
115] hold — we can conclude, succinctly, that the KS-View (22) completes the Model
Revolution at Stanford.
A complementary way to complete theModel Revolution, not to solve the problems
we have tried to solve, but to solve other problems concerning experimental science
rigorously, is outlined by P. Suppes (in this issue of Synthese).
8 Exitum: Scientific Representation
The concept of representation occurs in art, science, engineering, mathematics, astrol-
ogy, logic, linguistics, cinematography, religion and literature, poetry included. Rais-
ing the question whether it is possible to have a substantive philosophical account of
representation that covers all these varieties of human activity will cause mostly scep-
tical frowns rather than encouraging cheers. Did anyone ever conceive of this to be
possible? The best way to proceed, then, seems to follow Wittgenstein’s way: analyse
how the word ‘representation’ is used in all these different contexts; then try to find out
whether these uses have anything in common so as to identify that as the core of the
concept of representation; and then, finally, to adopt this core as the characterisation or
even definition of the concept of representation; if all this fails, we must presumably
conclude that representation is a family-resemblance concept.
Our very first step is to restrict our focus on representation in science, that is, on
scientific representation, and leave representation in all other mentioned fields aside,
and further focus on scientific representation according to the KS-View (22), that is, on
structural scientific representation, or simply structural representation for brevity.32
What the KS-View straightforwardly seems to say about representation is depicted
in Figure 3.
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S represents B iff S is a model of B
Figure 3: Representation according to the KS-View (22)
So ‘representation’ is another word for ‘model’. R.N. Giere however argues that in
order to make sense of (the practice of) science, representation should not be expressed
by a dyadic predicate, but by a quadratic predicate, which reads in our terminology:33
scientist S uses model S to represent being B for purpose P. (25)
Of course analysis (25) does not help a whiff to elucidate the relation between the
representing structure S and the represented being B — on the contrary, (25) only
complicates it. Furthermore, an analysis of the form (25) puts an end to what M. Sua´rez
has called a naturalised analysis of representation, because the epistemic agents and
their actions and purposes enter the analysis. Representation then has become partly
a pragmatic concept. To represent is a manifestation of human agency.
R. Frigg, who also takes models to be the representing entities (see Figure 3), has
listed six problems that a substantive philosophical account of scientific representation
must solve:34
(F1) Ontological Problem. What sort of enties are models?
(F2) Clarification Problem. In virtue of what does a model represent something
else?
(F3) Taxonomic Problem. What is the taxonomy of the various kinds of models that
are used in science?
(F4)Demarcation Problem. How to distinguish scientific from non-scientificmodels?
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(F5) Epistemological Problem. How to acquire knowledge of the world (of the con-
crete actual beings) from the models?
(F6) Problem of Misrepresentation. How to account for the fact that refuted, erro-
neous, idealised, approximate, inaccurate models never fail entirely to represent?
By construing the representation-relation between structure S and being B as an
isomorphism (or a sibling notion), Frigg has argued that the S-View (7) is unable to
solve most of these problems. Although a thorough inquiry of whether the improved
KS-View (22) fares better in meeting the Frigg Conditions (F1–F6) is beyond the scope
of the current paper, a few quick answers seem in order.
(F1) Ontological Problem. Models are set-structures.
(F2) Clarification Problem.
(F3) Taxonomic Problem. No stumbling blocks in the KS-View for erecting some
taxonomy of models used in science.
(F4) Demarcation Problem. Any set-structure in Vω+g can in principle be a model.
The problem of what distinguishes the activity of science from other human activ-
ities wherein representation occurs, such as art, engineering, astrology, literature
and cinematography, cannot and should not be solved by focusing on models
only.
(F5) Epistemological Problem. There is lots of propositional content stored in KS
(19) in Tτ (21) of the KS-View (22): there our scientific knowledge of the world is
expressed.
(F6) Problem of Misrepresentation. When we choose tailor-made morphisms on a
case by case basis, misrepresentation can easily be accounted for. Representor
and represented have at least one resemblance (otherwise one would never be
called a representation of the other), and precludes total misrepresentation.
M. Sua´rez [2003] has argued similarly that there are five arguments against a con-
strual of the representation-relation as isomorphism (or a sibling notion).
(S1) Variety Argument. There are lots of entities that represent but are not set-
structures.
(S2) Logical Argument (originally due toN. Goodman). The representation-relation
has different properties than the isomorphism-relation: the aforementioned is nei-
ther reflexive nor symmetric nor transitivewhereas the last-mentioned is an equivalence-
relation.
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(S3)Misrepresentation Argument. A model can be mistargeted or can be idealised,
approximate, inaccurate without loosing its representation-relation (cf. F6).
(S4) Non-necessity Argument. Representation-relations are not always isomor-
phisms (or sibling notions).
(S5)Non-sufficiency Argument. Isomorphisms (and sibling notions) are not always
representation-relations.
Again, although a thorough inquiry of whether the improved KS-View (22) also falls
prey to the Sua´rez Arguments is beyond the scope of the current paper, a few quick
responses seem in order.
(S1) Variety Argument. We decide ab initio to deal with scientific representations
only, which are (nearly) always set-structures.
(S2) Logical Argument. When we choose tailor-made morphisms on a case by case
basis, this argument breaks down.
(S3) Misrepresentation Argument. When we choose tailor-made morphisms on a
case by case basis, misrepresentation can easily be accounted for.
(S4) Non-necessity Argument. Sua´rez’s [2003: 235–236] counter-examples from art
can be set aside as irrelevant for representation in science.
(S5)Non-sufficiency Argument. Sua´rez’s [2003: 236] argument that morphisms lack
‘directionality’, which is an essential feature of the representation-relation, cannot
be met without extending the concept of representation to a form like (25).
I am under no illusion that these quick responses settle the representation debate
as far as the KS-View (22) is concerned. At best they point in directions worth in-
quiring into. As Frigg [2006, § 5] has emphasised, to construe the relation between a
model S and a being B as a morphism of any kind presupposes that B is a structure, be-
cause morphisms of any kind are defined as inter-structural relations. This ontological
presupposition is often taken for granted, but stands, of course, also in need of inquiry
— an inquiry that lies, too, beyond the scope of the current paper.35 When we avoid
this presupposition by taking the representation-relation (or equivalently the model-
of-relation; see Figure 3) as primitive, almost all of Sua´rez’s arguments loose their force.
But then Frigg’s Clarification Problem (F2) remains unsolved.
One way to solve it is to adopt a truth-conditonal view of meaning. We then at-
tempt to specify truth-conditions for the proposition: structure S represents being B
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(N). When we take B to be some phenomenon, the truth-condition is in terms of the
embeddability of the data structures extracted from B into S. For an empiricist, this
is sufficient. For a realist, this is not sufficient. But then the truth-condition for (N),
in particular when B is unobservable, launches us on the battle ground of the realism
debate. Alas! Beyond the scope of the current paper.
I have little to recommend my opinions. They come from one who desires honours, distinc-
tions, and emoluments, but little; and who expects them not at all; who has no contempt for
fame and no fear of obloquy; who shuns contention, though he will hazard an opinion; from
one who wishes to preserve consistency; but who would preserve consistency by varying his
means to secure the unity of his end; and, when the equipoise of the vessel in which he sails may
be endangered by overloading it upon one side, is desirous of carrying the small weight of his
reasons to that which may preserve his equipoise.
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Notes
1See O’Brien [1967: 42–43].
2McKinsey, Sugar and Suppes [1953], McKinsey and Suppes [1953], [1955], Suppes [1954].
3For the canonical review of the Logical- Positivistic views on scientific theories, see Suppe [1974].
4Here it is admittedly taken for granted that we can identify a scientific theory in scientific writings;
although this is not immune from philosophical doubt, it is hardly a speculative supposition for a science
as, say, physics.
5At the meta-level we have some weak set-theory to make this all possible rigorously. The concept of
‘object’ here is the metaphysically thin notion as used by Frege and Quine: it can be anything over which
we can quantify and for which we then must supply identity conditions — physical objects, persons,
processes, events, mental states, space-time points, dreams, numbers, sets, actions, etc.
6By ‘formalisation’ we mean what Frege meant: spelling out the alphabet, and all the formation and
deduction rules.
7Mathematical theories are about (particular kinds of) abstract objects only (numbers, geometrical
figures, sets, structures); scientific theories are about concrete actual beings. The existence of the objects
of mathematics is philosophically controversial; the existence of the objects of science is not, with the
exception of the unobservable ones.
8This concept of observational adequacy should not be confused with Van Fraassen’s well-known
concept of empirical adequacy. Three differences between the concepts of observational adequacy (Ob-
sAdeq) and empirical adequacy (EmpAdeq): (i) ObsAdeq relies on the distinction between theoretical
and observational concepts whereas EmpAdeq does not rely on that; (ii) ObsAdeq depends on historical
time whereas EmpAdeq is timeless (quantifies universally over historical time); (iii) EmpAdeq requires
for its definition a conception of a scientific theory that results from the Model Revolution, because it
cannot be defined in the conception we are expounding here. This last point, although explicitly and
clearly stated in The Scientific Image (Fraassen [1980: 54–55]), has been poorly appreciated by the commu-
nity of philosophers of science: witness that such eminent philosophers of science as M. Friedman, A.
30
Musgrave and the late P. Lipton are among the poor appreciators — see Muller & Van Fraassen [2008].
Both ObsAdeq and EmpAdeq rely on the distinction between observable and unobservable objects.
9Science harbours other kinds of knowledge as well, such as experimental results, knowledge of how
to design and to conduct a scientific experiment, and of how to apply theories.
10See Suppe [1974: 50–51].
11See Da Costa & Chuaqui [1988] for the definition of a ‘Suppes-predicate’; for a friendly definition of
Bourbaki’s related concept of a set-structure, see Muller [1998: 106–115].
12Some morphism, that is, isomorphism, partomorphism, monomorphism, epimorphism, partial iso-
morphism and perhaps more; see Muller [1998: 125–126].
13This means one can iterate the power-set operation on N, which we identify with ω, googol (g)
number of times. This yields all the Cartesian product-sets to have all the mathematical objects that
science needs and ever will need.
14Suppes [1974], Luce in Bogdan [1979: 93–110].
15See e.g. Putnam [1962], Toulmin [1974].
16Fraassen [1989: 225].
17Suppes [1954], [1968].
18See Suppes [1961], [1993], [2002], Bogdan [1979], Sneed [1971], Stegmu¨ller [1976], Rantala [1978],
Balzer, Sneed and Moulines [1987], Giere [1988], Costa & French [1990], Muller [1998].
19Typical is Morgan & Morrison [1999], who champion this approach with much clamor and less
clarity; see Giere [1988] for less clamor and more clarity.
20Somewhat devious is to ignore the mathematics of T also in the L-View and to take, by default,
always ZC as the mathematical part of every T. Then MATH(LT) = {∈} in (5).
21E.W. Beth [1968: 31–32]; this is the 2nd and revised edition of the first one from 1957.
22The correspondence between Beth’s characterisation [1968: 31–32], where the conditions are labeled
by Roman numerals, and De Jong & Betti’s [2008], is as follows: α–I, β–IV(b), γ–III, δ–II. Beth’s IV(a) is
the meaning of the fundamental concepts being evidently clear; his V(a) is that the principles should be
obviously true; and his V(b) is the soundness of the deduction-relation, which is construed epistemically
by De Jong & Betti, as in condition ζ.
23The essential content of Section 5, i.e. expounding the Problem of the Unavailable Stories, is at least
ten years old: see Muller [1998: 284–292].
24For a scientific criterion of observability, see Muller [2005: § 4, 5].
25D. Luce in Bogdan [1979: 93]: “More than any other living person, Suppes has affected contempo-
rary presentations of theories of measurement.” For a review of Measurement Theory, see Humphreys
[1994: 219–245]. Dı´ez [1997] puts Suppes’ role in historical perspective. For an elementary introduction
to the subject, see Carnap [1966: 62–104]. Krantz et al. [1971] is one volume of the encylopedia-type
series of books containing all data structures in science, together with representation and invariance
theorems.
26Krantz et al. [1971], Humphreys [1994: 219–245].
27The L-View is plagued by a similar problem, because its theoretical vocabulary is only partially
interpreted, i.e. connected to observation predicates in the correspondence postulates of T (2); the
theoretical vocabulary remains underdetermined.
28Suppes [2002, 20–21]. Suppes [1960: 289]: “I claim that the concept of a model in the sense of Tarski
may be used without distortion and as a fundamental concept . . .”
29Fraassen [1989: 221, 5–6].
31
30Translation in Logic is a concept also due to Tarski; see Muller [1998: 170–173] for details. To for-
malise making a model of some theory is to define a translation from the object-language in the meta-
language.
31This idea was first proposed in Muller [2005: § 6].
32Then we can gloss over examples and counter-examples of representation drawn from art etc. that
M. Sua´rez [2003] mobilises against structural scientific representation.
33Giere [2003: 743]. Giere identifies ‘general principles’ that scientists employ to construct models
of “features of the world” (of beings), and has no use any longer for the concept of a theory [2004:
744–747]. But a precise characterisation of these ‘general principles’ leads linea recta to a set-theoretical
predicate whose extension simply is a theory, so that the models constructed by scientists employing
general principles, and therefore obeying these principles, simply are members of that extension. Giere
effectively uses theories in full accordance to the structural view, but he no longer wishes to mentionwhat
he uses.
34Frigg [2006, § 2] lists three problems, of which one consists of two problems (our F1, F2, F3, F4 —
Frigg lumps F3 and F4 together), and two requirements (our F5 and F6).
35Sneed’s [1979: 135] well-known concept of an empirical claim needs this ontological presupposition
too when he wants to claim that a particular concrete actual being, say the solar system, is ‘a classical
particle-mechanical structure’. Sneed takes the presupposition for granted.
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